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Non-Technical Summary 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries have committed to legally binding 
emissions targets to be achieved during 2008 to 2012. To fulfil these commitments, the 
protocol allows for three flexible mechanisms: Besides International Emissions Trading, 
industrialized countries may generate emissions credits through project-based reductions. 
This can be done by investing in other industrialized regions in terms of Joint Implementation 
(JI) as well as in developing countries via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
prospect of large CDM potentials at low cost in developing countries has attracted the 
attention by industrialized countries. However, the attractiveness of the project-based 
mechanisms may be substantially diminished by investment barriers and environmental 
regulation of the CDM. 
This study quantifies the macroeconomic impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism 
under the Kyoto Protocol taking into account investment barriers such as transaction costs 
and investment risks in the host country. Moreover, we assess institutional constraints of 
CDM investment such as supplementarity and additionality regulations. For our quantitative 
analysis we employ a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of international trade 
and global energy use, integrating explicit project-based bottom-up CDM supply curves into 
our top-down macroeconomic model framework.  
We find that the CDM is an important flexibility mechanism to achieve the Kyoto targets at 
low cost – in particular, if industrialized countries intend to exclude Russian excess emissions 
permits (so-called “hot air”) from international emissions trading. The main driver of this 
result is the availability of large amounts of CDM credits at very low cost. The inclusion of 
risk and transaction costs increases the international carbon price by typically less than 1 US$ 
per ton of carbon dioxide. Thus they play an inferior role for the overall compliance costs. 
Much more relevant are policy constraints to using the CDM as reflected by additionality or 
supplementarity criteria, both inducing higher levels of domestic emissions abatement. While 
project-based emissions crediting clearly should generate emissions reductions in addition to 
those that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM, from a pure cost-effectiveness 
perspective our simulation analysis suggests caution against restrictive regulations of CDM 
access by means of a supplementarity rule.   
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CDM regulations through supplementarity and additionality criteria. Our numerical results 
show that the macroeconomic impacts of transaction costs and investment risks are 
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countries, compliance to the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved at a very low cost. However, 
regulatory restrictions such as a supplementarity criterion can substantially curtail the 
potential efficiency gains from where-flexibility in climate policy.  
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1 Introduction 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries as listed in Annex B of the agreement have 
committed to legally binding emissions targets to be achieved during 2008 to 2012. For these 
commitments to be fulfilled economically, the protocol allows for three flexible mechanisms: 
Besides international emissions trading, industrialized countries may undertake emissions 
crediting through project-based reductions – both in Annex B regions in terms of Joint 
Implementation (JI) as well as in developing countries in terms of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Imports of JI and CDM credits, i.e. Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) 
and Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), can thereby serve as substitutes for both 
domestic abatement action and international emissions trading. 
Given the prospects of larger CDM potentials at low cost in developing countries, CDM 
investments have attracted the attention by industrialized countries for meeting their 
emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Despite their potential for cost-efficient 
emissions abatement, the attractiveness of the project-based mechanisms may be substantially 
lowered by transaction costs arising from implementation procedures and bureaucracy (Jotzo 
and Michaelowa, 2002). Moreover, there can be larger risks associated with investments in 
CDM projects: If the economic or political stability in developing countries is weak, 
uncertainty about the effective crediting of envisaged emissions reductions might be high 
(Oleschak and Springer, 2007).  
Beyond considerations of transaction costs and investment risks, additional policy-driven 
regulations could substantially reduce the attractiveness of the CDM. The Marrakech Accords 
to the Kyoto Protocol demand that domestic emissions abatement (as opposed to the use of 
flexibility mechanisms) constitutes a “significant element” of the efforts made by each Annex 
B region to meet its target under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2002). Vice versa, the 
flexible mechanisms shall only be supplemental to domestic action. The limits to CER 
imports imposed by such a supplementarity rule could substantially curtail the potential cost-
savings from project-based crediting. Moreover, the Marrakech Accords require additionality 
of CDM projects: Abatement that would have also occurred in the absence of the registered 
CDM project activity in the developing region has to be excluded. 
In this paper we quantify the macroeconomic impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism 
under the Kyoto Protocol taking into account transaction costs and investment risks as well as 
supplementarity and additionality regulations. For our quantitative analysis we employ a 
large-scale computable general equilibrium model of international trade and global energy 
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use. Our numerical results suggest that a large supply of cheap CDM options – together with 
rather small effective emissions reduction requirements of Annex B countries – imply very 
low compliance cost of the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, transaction costs and investment risks 
play a negligible role while regulatory CDM restrictions – associated with additionality and 
supplementarity of the CDM – induce some (limited) increase of the permit price and 
economy-wide adjustment costs. 
The economic impacts of the flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have been 
assessed in several quantitative studies. Weyant and Hill (1999) provide a multi-model 
evaluation which confirms larger cost savings from where-flexibility based on global 
emissions trading. Böhringer and Löschel (2002) employ a partial equilibrium model to 
analyze the implications of investment risks for the magnitude and regional distribution of 
efficiency gains from project-based emissions crediting. Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005) assess 
the role of transaction costs and institutional rigidities for the market size of the CDM – 
likewise building on a numerical partial equilibrium approach. All of these studies focus on 
an implicit, top-down representation of CDM market supply.  
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold: Firstly, we integrate explicit project-
based bottom-up CDM supply curves into a top-down macroeconomic model framework. 
Secondly, we deliver a more comprehensive integrated analysis of the multiple determinants 
of potential CDM efficiency gains (i.e. investment risks and transaction costs as well as 
supplementarity and additionality restrictions). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe our 
numerical framework. In section 3, we lay out the climate policy scenarios underlying our 
simulation analysis. In section 4, we present quantitative results. In section 5, we conclude.  
 
2 Analytical  Framework 
2.1 Non-technical Model Summary 
For our simulation analysis we use a standard computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
of international trade and global energy use. CGE models have become the standard tool for 
economy-wide impact assessment of environmental policies (for surveys on applications to 
environmental policies see Conrad 1999, 2001) as they provide a comprehensive 
representation of price-dependent market interactions based on microeconomic theory. The 
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simultaneous explanation of the origin and spending of agents' incomes makes it possible to 
address both economy-wide efficiency as well as distributional impacts of policy interference. 
A central extension of the standard CGE framework for our analysis concerns the integration 
of bottom-up CDM supply curves for developing countries featuring specific transaction cost 
and investment risk aspects. Our extension builds on the availability of appropriate data 
which is described in section 2.2. In the following, we restrict ourselves to a short non-
technical summary of the CGE model underlying our numerical analysis. Details on the basic 
model algebra and parameterization are available in Böhringer (2000, 2002) or Böhringer and 
Vogt (2003, 2004).  
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic structure of the generic open-economy model. A 
representative agent RAr in each region r is endowed with three primary factors: labor rL , 
capital rK , and fossil-fuel resources ,ff rQ  (used for fossil fuel production). The representative 
agent maximizes utility from consumption of a composite good Cr which combines demands 
for energy and non-energy commodities at a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES). 
Production Yir of commodities i in region r is captured by nested separable CES functions that 
describe the price-dependent use of capital, labor, energy and material in production. Carbon 
emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the emission-relevant use of fossil fuels with 
carbon coefficients differentiated by the specific carbon content of fuels. Carbon abatement 
can take place by fuel switching or energy savings in production and final consumption.  
 
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic overview of the model structure 
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Trade is specified following the Armington approach of product heterogeneity (Armington, 
1969), i.e., domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are distinguished by origin. All 
goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a CES 
composite Air that combines the domestically produced variety Yir and imports Mir of the 
same variety from other regions. Domestic production Yir either enters the formation of the 
Armington good Air or is exported to satisfy the import demand of other regions. Trade with 
regions ROW (rest of the world) that are not explicitly represented in domestic production 
and consumption structures are described by a set of export demand and import supply 
functions. A balance of payment constraint, which is warranted through flexible exchange 
rates, incorporates the benchmark trade deficit or surplus between the explicit model regions 
and the rest of the world (ROW). 
 
2.2 Data and parameterization 
In this section we present the model calibration and the set of relevant inputs for our 
numerical analysis. These include project-based CDM supply curves, CDM transaction costs 
and investment risk indicators as well as emissions projections to 2010. 
 
Calibration 
The model is based on consistent accounts of national production and consumption, bilateral 
trade and energy flows for 2001 (as provided by the GTAP6 database – see Dimaranan and 
McDougall 2006). As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the benchmark 
data for quantities and prices together with exogenous elasticities determine the free 
parameters of the functional forms.  
In our comparative-static framework we infer the business-as-usual (BaU) structure of the 
model’s regions – i.e. the reference situation without exogenous emissions constraints – for 
2010 using most recent projections on economic development. These include expert 
projections for GDP growth, energy demand, fuel mixes in electricity generation, and future 
energy prices.1 We thereby use official data on trends for EU Member States (European 
Commission, 2003) and for non-European economies (US Department of Energy, 2005). The 
effects of climate policy interference are then measured with respect to the benchmark, i.e. 
BaU, situation where no carbon limits apply. 
                                                 
1 See Böhringer, Jensen, and Rutherford (2000) for a detailed description of related calibration techniques. 
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For our assessment of regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol, we include all major 
Annex B regions that have ratified the agreement and therefore face legally binding emissions 
reduction commitments: EU Member States, Russia, the remaining Former Soviet Union, 
Japan and Canada. Besides international emissions trading among each other, these regions 
may undertake project-based emissions reductions in developing regions (representing CDM 
host countries).2 Table 1 gives an overview of the Annex B regions that are incorporated 
explicitly in our model together with six major developing regions whose CDM options are 
represented by discrete project-based supply functions (see the following section for more 
details).  
 
Table 1: Model regions 
Model region Characteristics 
EU-27 
Russian Federation 
Rest of Former Soviet Union 
Japan 
Canada 
Annex B parties ratifying  
the Kyoto Protocol 
China incl. Hong Kong 
India 
Rest of East South Asia 
Brazil 
Central + South America 
South Africa 
CDM host countries 
 
At the sectoral level the model incorporates details on differences in factor intensities, 
degrees of factor substitutability and price elasticities of output demand in order to trace back 
the structural change induced by carbon abatement policies. The sectors in the model have 
been carefully selected to keep the most carbon-intensive sectors in the available data as 
separate as possible.  
The costs of complying with Kyoto crucially depend on the extent to which the emissions 
reduction commitments bind economies in the budget period between 2008 and 2012. The 
expected magnitude of abatement costs is directly linked to the structural characteristics of 
each particular economy exhibited in the BaU situation without exogenous emissions 
constraints. For example, higher economic growth in the baseline will – ceteris paribus – 
                                                 
2 Note that – in our model framework –  international emissions trading between Annex B parties includes JI. 
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result in increased BaU emissions that imply higher compliance costs with the Kyoto targets. 
On the other hand, energy efficiency improvements allow decoupling economic growth from 
emissions increase. The specific differences in economic development may alter the cross-
country differences with respect to the effective reduction requirement under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
 
Project-based CDM supply curves  
CDM supply curves for major host countries are explicitly implemented into the modelling 
framework based on detailed (bottom-up) information about project-specific abatement 
options. The discrete step functions for CDM supply are derived from a comprehensive 
database of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction options elaborated by Wetzelaer et al. (2007). 
The CDM database was built through evaluation and aggregation of GHG emissions 
reduction studies and concrete (implemented) CDM projects in non-Annex B countries. It 
comprises information on the abatement potential and cost of greenhouse gas reduction 
options for 30 non-Annex B countries and in total 371 reduction options. The country-
specific data on abatement potential and abatement cost have been translated into step 
functions, relating marginal abatement costs to abatement potential. To ensure compatibility 
with the microeconomic paradigm of rational behaviour underlying our CGE model, so-called 
“No-regret” options – reported in the CDM database – are assumed to be available at zero 
cost (rather than at negative cost). We will discuss the corresponding CDM supply data in 
more detail further down. 
 
Transaction costs 
The potential benefits of project-based abatement measures may be substantially reduced by 
transaction costs associated with abatement projects in developing countries. Such transaction 
costs may arise from a variety of activities associated with market exchange, including search 
and information acquisition, negotiation, monitoring or enforcement of contracts.   
In our bottom-up characterisation of CDM supply curves we incorporate estimates of project-
based transaction costs for CDM credits by Wetzelaer et al. (2007). Transaction cost enter our 
model as an absolute premium on marginal abatement costs of CDM host countries (typically 
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ranging between 0.2 and 0.7 US$/tCO2) and thereby induce an upward shift of the CDM 
supply curve.3 
 
Investment risk 
Investment risk involved in financing carbon-abatement projects constitutes another 
important aspect for the appropriate assessment of efficiency gains from project-based 
emissions crediting under the Kyoto Protocol.  
We adopt a composite indicator for CDM investment risks developed by Oleschak and 
Springer (2007). This indicator has been computed on the basis of a large pool of data for 143 
countries, which were divided into industrialized countries and developing and transition 
countries (CDM host countries). The indicator builds on three components: the institutional 
environment for CDM activities, the regulatory environment, and the economic environment. 
Country-specific information pertaining to each component has been weighted and 
aggregated. The composite indicator ranks the countries according to the total risk of 
investing in GHG abatement projects. Table 2 presents the CDM-specific investment risk 
premia for key CDM host regions.  
 
Table 2: CDM-specific investment risk premia for developing regions  
Region Risk premium (%) 
Brazil 4.6 
China including Hong Kong 1.8 
Central and South America 3.0 
India 1.8 
Rest of East South Asia 12.0 
South Africa 7.3 
Rest of World 16.0 
Source: Oleschak and Springer (2007) 
 
Investment risks enter our numerical model as a relative discount on the CER price (in %). 
Risk lowers the expected return of CDM projects and effectively induces an upward rotation 
of the CDM supply curve. 
                                                 
3 An alternative approach to account for CDM transaction costs is presented by Kallbekken et al. (2006), who 
introduce a so-called “participation rate” reflecting that only some share of potentially profitable CDM projects 
will be implemented. 
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Emissions projections for 2010 
Owing to the critical role of baseline projections for the simulation results, we provide further 
details on country-specific emissions in 2010 (our reference year for compliance to the Kyoto 
Protocol) and the associated effective reduction requirements for Annex B countries. 
Furthermore, we present the CDM supply curves for major developing regions. 
Table 3 summarizes baseline emissions for the years 1990 and 2010 across the Annex B 
countries explicitly incorporated in our model. The Kyoto reduction targets have been stated 
with respect to emissions levels in 1990 yielding implicit effective reduction requirements in 
2010 which depend on the region-specific baseline (BaU) emissions.  
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Table 3: Baseline emissions and reduction requirements of Annex-B countries  
 Baseline CO2 Emissions (Mt of CO2) 
Kyoto 
reduction  
target  
(% vs. 1990) 
Effective 
reduction 
requirement 
(% vs. 
baseline) 
Year
Region 1990 2010 2010 2010 
Austria 55.1 60.7 13.0 21.0 
Belgium 106.3 112.2 7.5 12.4 
Denmark 52.8 46.6 21.0 10.5 
Finland 53.2 51.4 0.0 -3.5 
France 354.1 406.4 0.0 12.9 
Germany 943.0 823.6 21.0 9.5 
UK 569.1 519.4 12.5 4.1 
Greece 71.1 105.6 -25.0 15.8 
Ireland 29.7 46.5 -13.0 27.8 
Italy 390.8 422.2 6.5 13.5 
Netherlands 152.9 174.0 6.0 17.4 
Portugal 39.0 67.9 -27.0 27.1 
Spain 203.8 302.6 -15.0 22.5 
Sweden 50.6 54.0 -4.0 2.5 
Luxemburg 10.6 11.6 28.0 34.2 
Hungary 68.5 62.2 6.0 -3.5 
Poland 340.1 286.2 6.0 -11.7 
Cyprus 4.5 8.1 - - 
Czech Rep. 158.8 103.1 8.0 -41.7 
Malta 2.5 3.3 - - 
Slovakia 51.4 41.6 8.0 -13.7 
Slovenia 10.9 14.0 8.0 28.4 
Estonia 36.6 14.2 8.0 -137.1 
Latvia 16.9 8.3 8.0 -87.3 
Lithuania 32.2 17.2 8.0 -72.2 
Bulgaria 73.6 42.9 8.0 -57.8 
Romania 168.6 90.3 8.0 -71.8 
Canada 473.0 681.0 6.0 34.7 
Japan 990.0 1211.0 6.0 23.2 
Russia 2347.0 1732.0 0.0 -35.5 
Rest of FSU 1452.0 1072.0 0.0 -35.4 
Sources: European Commission (2003): European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030; US 
Department of Energy (2005): International Energy Outlook; own calculations 
 
Following the information in Table 3, the effective reduction requirements for EU-27 
Member States range from more than 30 percent (here: Luxemburg) to negative 
“requirements” of more than 100 percent  (here: Estonia). The aggregate EU-27 target for 
2010 therefore turns out to be rather low vis-à-vis the BaU emissions level in 2010 as 
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compared to rather substantial cutback requirements for other signatory OECD regions like 
Canada or Japan. In contrast, Russia stands out for a large negative effective reduction 
requirement. Unrestricted availability of the associated excess emissions permits from Russia 
(usually referred to as “hot air”) to the international emissions market would therefore result 
in very low effective reduction requirements across all signatory Annex B regions.  
The supply side situation is complemented by potential CDM project activities in Non-Annex 
B countries. Table 4 shows that within our project-based CDM dataset, China and India turn 
out as the key CDM suppliers accounting for more than 60 percent of the total emissions 
reduction potential in developing countries in 2010. 
 
Table 4: CDM supply potential for whole cost range by Non-Annex B region 
Region CDM supply potential  in 2010 (Mt CO2) 
Brazil 67.2 
China including Hong Kong 616.9 
Central and South America 195.9 
India 390.0 
Rest of East South Asia 213.1 
South Africa 37.7 
Rest of World 125.8 
Total 1646.6 
Source: Wetzelaer et al. (2007) 
 
Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, the aggregate CDM supply function (relating abatement 
potential to marginal abatement costs) suggests large abatement potential at zero or even 
“negative” costs. Moreover, the figure presents a CDM supply curve including transaction 
costs, as well as a curve including transaction costs and investment risk – both of which 
represent an upwardly shifted original supply curve. 
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Figure 2: Excerpt of the aggregate marginal abatement cost (MAC) for the Non-Annex B 
region considering transaction costs (TC) and investment risk (RISK) 
Source: Wetzelaer et al. (2007) 
 
With unrestricted supply of “hot air” and CDM we would expect the price for emissions on 
competitive international markets to drop to zero since aggregate supply exceeds the effective 
demand. Regarding environmental effectiveness and compliance cost, policy-driven 
quantitative limits to “hot air” and CDM supply may become much more important than 
market-inherent barriers to CDM in terms of transaction costs and investment risks. Major 
institutional climate policy constraints include additionality (restriction to CDM projects 
which would not be undertaken without the provision of the flexibility mechanisms) and 
supplementarity (requiring that a minimum of abatement efforts should be undertaken 
domestically). 
 
3 Climate Policy Scenarios 
We design climate policy scenarios to address in particular the role of the CDM under the 
Kyoto Protocol. More specifically, we are interested in the quantitative effects of the CDM 
for the compliance cost of Annex B countries taking into account investment barriers 
(transaction costs and investment risks) as well as institutional climate policy constraints 
(additionality and supplementarity). 
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The Marrakech Accords demand that domestic actions (as opposed to the use of the flexible 
mechanisms Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism) constitute a “significant element” of the efforts made by each Annex B Party to 
meet its target under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2002). While there is no explicit 
quantified proportion to be met through domestic action, Annex B Parties must provide 
information in their national communications under the Protocol to demonstrate that their use 
of the mechanisms is “supplemental to domestic action” to achieve their targets. One policy-
relevant proposal to quantify a CER import limit as a supplementarity rule stems from the 
European Union, essentially stating that no more than 50 percent of an Annex B reduction 
commitment may be fulfilled by imports from the flexible mechanisms (Langrock and Sterk, 
2004). We take the EU proposal as the reference for an optional supplementarity rule in our 
simulations. 
Moreover, the Marrakech Accords define additionality for emission-reduction CDM projects 
by specifying that “a CDM project activity is additional if anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those that would have occurred in the 
absence of the registered CDM project activity” (UNFCCC, 2002). We address this issue via 
financial additionality, implying that no investments that would have been undertaken in the 
absence of a CDM registration may be labeled as CDM (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2006). In 
this case, emissions abatement options in Non-Annex B countries with negative abatement 
costs (so-called “No-Regret” options) are therefore not eligible for the CDM. 
In our four central scenarios we combine alternative assumptions on CDM access, transaction 
costs, and investment risks (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: CDM characteristics of climate policy scenarios 
Scenario acronym CDM access Transaction costs Investment risk 
ET No No No 
ET_CDM Yes No No 
ET_CDM_TC Yes Yes No 
ET_CDM_TC_RISK Yes Yes Yes 
 
In order to reflect policy-relevant institutional policy regulations of permit supply from the 
CDM as well as “hot air”, we investigate how the results for our central scenarios will change 
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depending on additionality / supplementarity rules and a “hot air” limit (i.e. zero supply of 
excess permits by Russia). 
 
4 Simulation Results 
The impacts of climate policies are measured with respect to a hypothetical BaU scenario 
where no climate policy regime applies.4 Table 6 reports the prices for emissions permits 
across the central scenarios combined with alternative regulatory constraints on CDM supply 
and “hot air” access. 
 
Table 6: International carbon permit price ($US per ton of CO2) 
Scenario 
 
Restriction 
ET ET_CDM ET_CDM_ TC 
ET_CDM_ 
TC_RISK 
Hot Air 3.19 0.00 0.20 0.23
No Hot Air 12.62 0.71 0.81 0.98
Additionality  
(No Hot Air)  12.62 2.47 2.75 2.80
Supplementarity 
 (No Hot Air) 12.62 see Table 7 see Table 7 see Table 7
 
We see that the CO2 permit price resulting from international emissions trading in the absence 
of the CDM but with full “hot air” supply amounts to roughly 3 US$. This result can be 
traced back to the rather low effective emissions reduction requirements of Annex B countries 
combined with large supplies of excess permits by Russia. If we fully ban “hot air” supply, 
the international permit price quadruples: Marginal abatement costs across Annex B countries 
increase drastically as larger parts of emissions reduction requirements can no longer be 
covered by pure paper trade but require actual abatement. In a policy regime with unlimited 
access of Annex B regions to CDM and unlimited supply of “hot air” the CO2 value falls to 
zero as we simultaneously abstract from CDM transaction costs and investment risks: “Hot 
air” supply by Russia together with large CDM inflows at zero cost induce a situation of 
excess supply on the international market for emissions permits. When we consider CDM 
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transaction costs (in terms of an absolute price premium), the permit value slightly increases 
to 0.2 US$. Additional investment risks of CDM projects (in terms of a relative price 
premium) lead to a further – but rather small – increase of the CO2 value. In the absence of 
“hot air” supply but with unlimited CDM access, we still obtain a permit price of less than 
one dollar (0.71 US$). Transaction cost and investment risk premia again have only very 
small impacts on the effective carbon price. 
An additionality rule restricts the number of projects eligible for the CDM, aiming at filtering 
out so-called “No-Regret” options.5 As a consequence, the CDM options available for Annex 
B countries are reduced substantially. Table 6 indicates that additionality implies a substantial 
increase in the CO2 value: The permit price rises to roughly 2.5 US$. As in the case of 
unrestricted CDM projects, transaction costs and investment risk cause only very small price 
increases. 
Under a supplementarity rule, the resulting regional marginal abatement costs are composed 
of the international permit price and region-specific shadow prices of the implicit permit 
import quota that generates the required domestic emissions reductions.6 Complementing the 
information provided in Table 6, Table 7 reports marginal abatement costs across model 
regions under a supplementarity criterion (and excluding “hot air” supply). A supplementarity 
rule restricts CDM permit imports and thereby exerts a downward pressure on the supply-side 
value of CDM credits (like an import tariff). On the other hand, the import quota drives up the 
effective marginal abatement cost at the regional level since Annex B countries must achieve 
a minimum of (in our case) 50 percent of the effective national reduction requirement through 
domestic action. Transaction costs and investment risk have only negligible impacts on these 
marginal costs where the major cost component stems from domestic action and is unaffected 
from barriers to project-based emissions abatement. 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Note that the listing of two digits should not pretend any prognostic precision or accuracy but simply helps to 
highlight (potentially small) differences across different scenarios. 
5 The permanence of such options, implying negative marginal abatement costs, may stem from implicit 
investment barriers such as incomplete information. 
6 If regional marginal abatement costs for the required domestic abatement exceed the international permit price, 
the regional shadow price is given by the difference of the two values. Otherwise, the shadow price is zero. 
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Table 7: Supplementarity (No Hot Air) – marginal abatement costs ($US / ton of CO2) 
Scenario 
 
Region  
ET_CDM ET_CDM_ TC 
ET_CDM_ 
TC_RISK 
Austria                 29.25 29.28 29.29 
Belgium 27.72 27.73 27.73 
Denmark              3.77 3.78 3.78 
Finland                0.27 0.47 0.48 
France                 16.89 16.89 16.89 
Germany              3.53 3.53 3.53 
United Kingdom 5.33 5.34 5.34 
Greece                 3.65 3.66 3.66 
Ireland                 16.08 16.08 16.08 
Italy                      14.19 14.20 14.20 
Netherlands         13.95 13.95 13.95 
Portugal               16.98 17.00 17.00 
Spain                    19.52 19.52 19.52 
Sweden 4.47 4.48 4.48 
Hungary 1.07 1.08 1.08 
Poland 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Czech Republic 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Slovakia 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Bulgaria 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Romania 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Rest of EU 28.13 28.15 28.15 
Baltic States 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Canada 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Japan 0.27 0.47 0.48 
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rest of FSU 0.27 0.47 0.48 
 
Table 8 summarizes the emissions reductions from Business-as-Usual (BaU) emissions levels 
across our climate policy scenarios.7 
                                                 
7 Note that in our reporting of simulation results, in the following we concentrate on Russia as the central 
supplier of excess emissions permits. 
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Table 8: Emissions reduction by region (% vs. BAU) 
Scenario 
 
Region  
ET ET_CDM ET_CDM_ TC 
ET_CDM_ 
TC_RISK 
Hot Air 
EU-27 -4.50  0.00  -0.40  -0.40  
Canada -2.90  0.00  -0.20  -0.20  
Japan -4.70  0.00  -0.30  -0.40  
Russia -3.00  0.00  -0.20  -0.20  
No Hot Air 
EU-27 -12.50  -1.20  -1.30  -1.60
Canada -11.70  -0.60  -0.70  -0.90
Japan -12.70  -1.20  -1.30  -1.60
Russia 0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Additionality (No Hot Air) 
EU-27 -12.50  -3.70  -4.00  -4.10
Canada -11.70  -2.20  -2.40  -2.50
Japan -12.70  -3.80  -4.10  -4.20
Russia 0.50  0.10  0.10  0.10  
Supplementarity (No Hot Air) 
EU-27 -12.50  -6.30  -6.40  -6.40  
Canada -11.70  -0.20  -0.40  -0.40  
Japan -12.70  -0.50  -0.80  -0.80  
Russia 0.50  0.10  0.10  0.10  
 
In general, the magnitude of emissions reductions reflects – ceteris paribus – the level of the 
marginal abatement cost: The higher the marginal abatement cost, the higher is the associated 
domestic emissions reduction. In this vein, Table 8 reports an almost threefold emissions 
abatement in EU-27 triggered by the limitation of “hot air” supply and the associated increase 
in the international permit price for the base scenario “ET” (as we compare variants “hot air” 
and no “hot air”). CDM supply induces very low emissions reduction levels by EU-27 due to 
larger permit imports. Both CDM regulations – additionality as well as supplementarity – 
increase domestic emissions abatement by EU-27 regions substantially. While the abatement 
effects for non-EU countries with effective emissions reduction requirements are comparable 
to the EU effects for alternative “hot air” specifications and an additionality rule, a 
supplementarity criterion does not increase domestic abatement of these countries 
substantially. Obviously, under unlimited CDM Japan and Canada have not yet reached the 
respective import thresholds implied by a supplementarity rule.  
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Table 9 summarizes economy-wide adjustment cost of emissions regulation across regions. 
Theses inframarginal costs can be expressed as a change in the Hicksian equivalent variation 
(HEV) measuring the change in real income which is necessary to make the economy under 
regulation as well off as under BaU. A positive HEV thus indicates net economic gains 
whereas a negative HEV signals an economic loss.8 
 
Table 9: Welfare impacts by region (% change HEV) 
Scenario 
 
Region  
ET ET_CDM ET_CDM_ TC 
ET_CDM_ 
TC_RISK 
Hot Air 
EU-27 -0.009 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Canada -0.139 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 
Japan -0.018 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Russia 0.519 0.000 0.032 0.036 
No Hot Air 
EU-27 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Canada -0.489 -0.032 -0.036 -0.044 
Japan -0.054 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
Russia -0.046 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
Additionality (No Hot Air) 
EU-27 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
Canada -0.489 -0.108 -0.120 -0.122 
Japan -0.054 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
Russia -0.046 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
Supplementarity (No Hot Air) 
EU-27 -0.001 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 
Canada -0.489 -0.016 -0.025 -0.026 
Japan -0.054 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
Russia -0.046 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 
We observe that the welfare impacts for the EU-27 from emissions reduction requirements 
under the Kyoto Protocol are in general very small. Allowing for CDM, non-negligible 
welfare costs are only present in the cases of additionality and supplementarity regulations 
                                                 
8 Note that we pursue a cost-effectiveness analysis that quantifies adjustment costs of environmental regulation 
as compared to an unconstrained business-as-usual situation. We thereby deliberately neglect the economic 
benefits from controlling global warming. Again the listing of three digits should not pretend any prognostic 
precision or accuracy but simply helps to highlight (potentially small) differences across different scenarios. 
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which restrict CDM supply and demand, thereby increasing adjustment costs. Welfare costs 
for the EU-27 are highest in a supplementarity setting where “hot air” is simultaneously 
restricted. Transaction costs and CDM investment risk hardly affect the economy-wide 
adjustment cost of emissions constraints.  
As a supplier of excess emissions permits Russia is largely benefiting from a climate policy 
regime where “hot air” is unrestricted, but faces welfare costs in the case of a ban of its 
respective supplies. While the welfare effects for non-EU countries with effective emissions 
reduction requirements are comparable to the EU effects regarding “hot air” and the CDM, 
for Japan and Canada the regulations of project-based crediting generate reversed impacts: As 
under unlimited CDM these countries have not yet reached the respective import thresholds 
implied by a supplementarity rule, it is the additionality regulation that naturally implies a 
higher level of welfare costs for the respective economies.  
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the macroeconomic impacts of the Clean Development 
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. For our quantitative analysis we have employed a 
large-scale computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use that 
reflects the project-based character of the CDM by integrating explicit bottom-up CDM 
supply curves. We have examined the implications of CDM transaction costs and investment 
risk as well as the consequences of explicit policy constraints on CDM supply (in terms of 
supplementarity and additionality rules) and the availability of “hot air”. 
We find that the CDM is an important flexibility mechanism to achieve the Kyoto targets at 
low cost – in particular, if Annex B countries intend to exclude “hot air” from international 
emissions trading. The main driver of this result is the availability of large amounts of CDM 
credits at very low cost. As cost determinants, transaction costs and investment risk of 
project-based emissions crediting play only an inferior role. Much more relevant for the 
overall compliance costs are policy constraints to the use of the CDM as reflected by 
additionality or supplementarity criteria, both inducing higher levels of domestic emissions 
abatement. Project-based emissions crediting clearly should generate emissions reductions 
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the CDM – from a pure cost-
effectiveness perspective, our simulation analysis warrants however caution against 
restrictive regulations of CDM access by means of a supplementarity rule.   
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